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Institutional	Legitimacy*		N.	P.	Adams		 Philosophy,	Goethe	University	Frankfurt		Our	current	understanding	of	the	idea	of	legitimacy	is	deeply	connected	to	the	peculiarly	modern	political	institution	of	the	nation-state.1	But	questions	of	legitimacy	have	moved	beyond	the	state.	It	is	now	common	to	examine	the	legitimacy	of	institutions	such	as	the	European	Union,	 international	courts,	 international	human	rights	 institutions,	or	 those	focused	on	specific	issues,	like	the	World	Trade	Organization	or	particular	transnational	non-governmental	 organizations.2	 As	 our	 traditional	 state-centric	 understanding	 of	legitimacy	 is	 applied	 to	 these	 new	 modes	 of	 governance	 and	 new	 varieties	 of	institutions,	however,	it	 is	becoming	increasingly	strained.	The	concepts	and	standards	developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 a	 much	 less	 globalized,	 much	 more	Westphalian	world	may	be	inadequate	for	the	contemporary	context.	Theorists	have	responded	to	this	tension	in	two	general	ways.3	One	strategy	is	to	take	 a	 traditional	 state-centric	 understanding	 of	 political	 legitimacy	 and	 modify	 it	 as	
                         
* My	thanks	to	Merten	Reglitz,	Antoinette	Scherz,	and	Cord	Schmelzle	for	their	feedback	on	this	paper	and	for	many	 incisive	 conversations	 on	 this	 topic.	 An	 early	 version	 of	 this	 argument	 was	 presented	 at	 the	workshop	“International	Legitimacy	and	Law”	at	Goethe	University	Frankfurt	in	July	2015;	thanks	to	the	organizer	and	audience	for	the	discussion.	In	addition,	thanks	also	to	three	anonymous	reviewers	of	this	journal	for	their	helpful	comments	and	suggestions.	1	The	term	‘legitimate’	gets	used	in	a	huge	variety	of	ways,	often	simply	to	mean	“justified.”	My	account	is	not	meant	to	capture	all	of	the	many	ways	the	language	of	legitimacy	is	applied.	Section	one	outlines	the	sense	 of	 the	 term	 that	 I	 am	 interested	 in;	 as	will	 be	 clear,	my	 concern	 is	 with	 the	 normative	 sense	 of	legitimacy,	not	the	dependent	descriptive	or	sociological	sense.	2	 Here	 is	 an	 extremely	 incomplete	 but	 somewhat	 representative	 sampling	 to	 illustrate	 the	 variety	 of	international	legitimacy	claims	that	are	being	made	in	an	increasingly	large	literature.	On	the	EU:	Andreas	Føllesdal,	“The	Legitimacy	Deficits	of	the	European	Union,”	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	14	(2006),	441-468;	Jürgen	Neyer,	“Europe’s	Justice	Deficit:	Justification	and	Legitimacy	in	the	European	Union,”	Political	
Theory	 of	 the	 European	Union,	ed.	 by	 Jürgen	Neyer	 and	Antje	Wiener	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	 Press,	2011),	 pp.	 169-186;	 on	 international	 law:	 John	 Tasioulas,	 “The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Law,”	 The	
Philosophy	of	 International	Law,	 ed.	by	Samantha	Besson	and	 John	Tasioulas	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010),	pp.	97-116;	Thomas	Christiano,	 “Democratic	Legitimacy	and	 International	 Institutions,”	 in	Besson	and	Tasioulas,	The	Philosophy	of	International	Law,	pp.	119-137;	Allen	Buchanan,	“The	Legitimacy	of	 International	 Law,”	 in	 Besson	 and	 Tasioulas,	 The	 Philosophy	 of	 International	 Law,	 pp.	 79-96;	Christopher	A.	Thomas,	“The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Legitimacy	in	International	Law,”	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	
Studies,	34	 (2014),	 729-758;	 Daniel	 Bodansky,	 “The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Governance:	 A	 Coming	Challenge	 for	 International	Environmental	Law?”	The	American	 Journal	of	 International	Law,	93	 (1999),	596-624;	 on	 human	 rights:	 The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Human	 Rights	 Regimes,	 ed.	 by	 Andreas	Føllesdal,	Johan	Karlsson	Schaffer,	and	Geir	Ulfstein	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014);	Allen	Buchanan,	 The	 Heart	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2013);	 on	 more	 specific	institutions:	 Richard	 Higgott	 and	 Eva	 Erman,	 “Deliberative	 global	 governance	 and	 the	 question	 of	legitimacy:	what	can	we	learn	from	the	WTO?”	Review	of	International	Studies,	36	(2010),	449-470;	Vivien	Collingwood,	“Non-governmental	organisations,	power,	and	legitimacy	in	international	society,”	Review	of	
International	 Studies,	32	 (2006),	 439-454;	 finally,	 on	 the	 entire	 global	 system,	 see	 Allen	 Buchanan	 and	Robert	O.	Keohane,	“The	Legitimacy	of	Global	Governance	Institutions,”	Ethics	and	International	Affairs,	20	(2006),	405-437;	Ian	Clark,	“Legitimacy	in	a	Global	Order,”	Review	of	International	Studies,	29	(2003),	75-95.		3	Cf.	Samantha	Besson,	“The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil,”	Sydney	Law	Review,	31	(2009),	343-380	at	p.	349.	I	ignore	the	more	radically	skeptical	option	of	rejecting	the	notion	of	legitimacy	altogether.	
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little	as	possible	when	applying	it	to	the	wide	variety	of	international	institutions.4	The	other	strategy	is	to	posit	a	novel	notion	of	political	legitimacy	that	is	distinct	from	state	legitimacy	and	applies	to	some	set	of	international	institutions.5		The	point	of	this	paper	is	to	suggest	that	a	third,	more	revisionary	strategy	should	be	 pursued:	 begin	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 generality	 with	 the	 question	 of	 institutional	
legitimacy.	I	argue	for	an	underlying	notion	of	legitimacy	that	applies	to	all	institutions,	political	 or	 otherwise.	 Understanding	 this	 underlying	 notion	will	 illuminate	 the	more	particular	case	of	political	institutions	in	all	their	variety.	My	 aims	 here	 are	 primarily	 exploratory;	 I	 intend	 to	 open	 up	 new	 avenues	 for	theorizing	without	claiming	to	have	 fully	stepped	down	those	paths.	My	hope	 is	 that	a	new	approach	 to	 the	question	of	 legitimacy	will	not	only	be	useful	 for	 the	burgeoning	concern	with	international	institutions	but	will	also	force	us	to	revise	our	understanding	of	 what	 it	 means	 for	 states	 to	 be	 legitimate.	Whether	 that	 hope	 will	 be	 realized	 is	 a	question	for	further	down	the	line.		In	 section	 one	 I	 argue	 for	 a	 practical	 approach	 to	 legitimacy,	 showing	 that	 it	captures	 a	 type	 of	 moral	 standing	 that	 allows	 people	 to	 coordinate	 their	 practical	responses	 to	 institutions	 and	 institutional	 demands.	 I	 conclude	 that	 legitimacy	 must	capture	an	institution’s	right	to	function	without	coercive	interference.	This	leads	me	to	analyze	 legitimacy	by	analogy	to	 individuals’	 rights	 to	non-interference	 in	section	two,	focusing	on	 the	 idea	of	rights	 forfeiture.	 In	section	 three	 I	consider	 the	 implications	of	my	general	approach	for	questions	of	political	legitimacy.	Finally,	in	section	four	I	apply	this	 approach	 to	 the	 particular	 case	 of	 the	 state	 and	 show	 how	 a	 minimalist	understanding	of	 state	 legitimacy	 is	 both	plausible	 and	opens	up	new	possibilities	 for	understanding	our	relation	to	the	state.		 I.	A	New	Concept	of	Legitimacy		As	standardly	conceived,	legitimacy	is	the	right	to	rule:	a	legitimate	state	has	the	right	to	rule	 and	 an	 illegitimate	 state	 does	 not.	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 right	 is	 widely	 contested,	variously	taking	the	form	of	a	claim-right,6	a	power-right,7	or	a	liberty-right.8	Theorists	disagree	about	what	sort	of	standing	legitimacy	constitutes	(e.g.	claim,	power,	or	liberty)	as	well	as	what	sort	of	“uptake”	legitimacy	demands	of	others	(e.g.	a	duty	of	obedience	
                         4	For	example,	Tasioulas,	 “The	Legitimacy	of	 International	Law”	and	Christiano,	 “Democratic	Legitimacy	and	 International	 Institutions”	both	 follow	 this	 strategy	by	directly	 applying	 frameworks	developed	 for	states	(a	Razian	approach	and	democratic	theory,	respectively)	to	questions	about	non-state	institutions.	Also	 see	 Ronald	 Dworkin,	 “A	 New	 Philosophy	 for	 International	 Law,”	 Philosophy	 &	 Public	 Affairs,	 41	(2013),	2-30.	5	See	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights;	Higgott	and	Erman,	“Deliberative	global	governance	and	the	question	 of	 legitimacy:	 what	 can	 we	 learn	 from	 the	 WTO?”;	 Collingwood,	 “Non-governmental	organisations,	 power,	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 international	 society,”	 p.	 452.	 Distinguishing	 between	 the	strategies	 is	 often	 difficult,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 disagreement	 about	 what	 is	 central	 to	 the	 concept	 of	legitimacy	and	what	instead	falls	under	particular	conceptions.		6	 See,	 e.g.,	 A.	 John	 Simmons,	Moral	 Principles	 and	 Political	 Obligations	 (Princeton:	 Princeton,	 University	Press	 1979);	 Andrew	Altman	 and	 Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	A	 Liberal	 Theory	 of	 International	 Justice	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	Christopher	W.	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998).		7	 See,	 e.g.,	 Joseph	 Raz,	 The	 Authority	 of	 Law	 2nd	 ed.	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2009)	 and	 The	
Morality	 of	 Justice	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 1986);	 Leslie	 Green,	 The	 Authority	 of	 the	 State	(Oxford:	 Clarendon	 Press,	 1988);	 Arthur	 Isak	 Applbaum,	 “Legitimacy	 without	 the	 Duty	 to	 Obey,”	
Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	38	(2010),	215-239;	Merten	Reglitz,	 “Political	Legitimacy	Without	a	(Claim-)	Right	to	Rule,”	Res	Publica,	21	(2015),	291-307.	8	Robert	Ladenson,	“In	Defense	of	a	Hobbesian	Conception	of	Law,”	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	9	(1980),	134-159.	Ladenson	uses	‘justification-right’.	
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or	 deference,	 a	 liability,	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 claim).9	 Despite	 these	 differences,	 theorists	following	the	traditional	approach	all	focus	on	ruling	because	their	object	of	analysis	is	the	state.	Whatever	else	it	does,	the	state	issues	rules	in	the	form	of	laws	and	coercively	enforces	 those	 rules.	 The	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 state	 is	 legitimate	 becomes	 the	question	 of	whether	 it	 has	 the	 standing	 to	 issue	 and	 enforce	 rules	 in	 the	ways	 that	 it	does.		 It	is	clear	why	it	is	difficult	to	apply	considerations	of	legitimacy	to	international	institutions	 on	 the	 standard	 approach.	 The	 territorially-bound,	 force-monopolizing,	sovereignty-claiming	state	 is	very	different	 from	the	 international	political	 institutions	that	increasingly	characterize	our	world.10	These	institutions	rule	in	a	very	different	way	from	the	state,	if	they	rule	at	all.11	The	rules	of	international	law	are	very	different	from	the	 rules	of	domestic	 law;	 the	methods	of	 enforcement,	 insofar	 as	 they	 exist,	 are	 very	different	as	well.	The	 conceptions	and	standards	of	 legitimacy	 that	were	developed	 to	answer	the	question	of	whether	a	state	has	the	right	to	rule	do	not	seem	applicable	to	institutions	that	do	not	rule	in	the	way	states	rule.	The	 revisionary	 strategy	 I	 am	pursuing	here	 asks	us	 to	 reject	 the	 very	 starting	point	 of	 the	 traditional	 approach,	 namely	 the	 focus	 on	 ruling.12	 But	 if	we	do	not	 start	with	 rule,	 where	 do	 we	 begin?	 Here	 I	 follow	 (and	 modify)	 Allen	 Buchanan’s	 general	strategy,	 which	 takes	 a	 practical	 approach	 to	 legitimacy	 by	 asking	 what	 we	 use	evaluations	of	legitimacy	for.	We	evaluate	institutions	in	a	huge	variety	of	ways,	asking	whether	 they	are	 just,	or	 fair,	or	 respectful,	 and	so	on.	Among	 this	variety	 the	distinct	role	of	legitimacy	is	to	solve	what	Buchanan	calls	the	metacoordination	problem.13			Institutions	solve	first	order	coordination	problems	by	providing	shared	signals	and	norms	that	coordinate	individuals’	behavior	and	thereby	enable	us	to	attain	a	wide	variety	of	goods	that	would	otherwise	be	unavailable.	Buchanan	is	 focused	on	political	goods	 like	 providing	 for	 basic	 needs	 or	 protection	 from	 standard	 threats.	 However,	institutions	 are	 also	 indispensable	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	 non-political	 goods,	 most	obviously	 the	 goods	 of	 free	 association	 that	 arise	 when	 people	 exercise	 their	autonomous	choices	about	whom	to	associate	with	and	how	to	associate	with	them.		 But	institutions	can	only	function,	and	so	these	goods	can	only	be	attained,	under	certain	conditions.	The	main	problem	is	disagreement.	We	disagree	about	what	sorts	of	goods	should	actually	be	pursued;	among	the	goods	we	agree	about,	we	disagree	about	their	prioritization;	we	disagree	about	what	sorts	of	institutions	will	be	best	at	achieving	those	goods.	We	disagree	about	when	we	should	abandon	an	 institution	as	 too	 flawed	and	when	we	need	to	begin	anew;	we	disagree	about	what	sorts	of	aims	and	what	sorts	of	institutional	methods	should	actively	be	suppressed.	Due	to	all	these	disagreements,	
                         9	 These	 classifications	 follow	 Wesley	 Newcomb	 Hohfeld,	 Fundamental	 Legal	 Conceptions	 as	 Applied	 to	
Judicial	Reasoning	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1919).	10	For	insightful	discussion	on	defining	the	state	and	accompanying	challenges,	see	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	
Modern	State.	11	See	Buchanan,	“The	Legitimacy	of	International	Law,”	pp.	81ff;	Christiano,	“Democratic	Legitimacy	and	International	 Institutions.”	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 simplifying	 assumption	 that	 states	 rule	 in	 a	distinctive	and	unified	manner	makes	a	contested	empirical	claim	and	may	indeed	be	false;	my	purpose	is	not	 to	uphold	 this	assumption	but	 to	describe	 the	 literature	as	 it	exists.	As	will	become	clear	 in	 section	three,	my	account	is	in	fact	quite	amenable	to	the	idea	that	there	is	no	unifying,	formal	understanding	of	state	 rule.	While	 this	 could	be	devastating	 for	 some	 theories	of	 legitimacy,	particularly	 those	 that	 claim	legitimacy	is	the	right	to	rule	in	some	particularly	technical	way,	it	works	well	with	my	general	approach	that	focuses	on	rights	violations.	12	 I	 am	not	 going	 to	 examine	 the	prospects	 for	 other	 strategies;	my	 claim	 is	 not	 that	 there	 are	no	 such	prospects,	just	that	there	may	well	be	good	prospects	for	a	new,	revisionary	strategy.		13	For	the	fullest	and	most	recent	presentation	of	this,	see	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	especially	chapter	five.	
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institutions	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 function	 if	 we	 were	 to	 each	 follow	 our	 own	understanding	 of	 the	 good.	We	would	 support	 only	 those	 institutions	 that	 pursue	 the	good	as	we	understand	it,	 in	the	order	we	prefer,	and	we	would	interfere	according	to	our	own	lights.	Under	the	constant	threat	of	interference	and	the	uncertainty	of	conflict,	institutions	would	be	unable	to	establish	the	sort	of	sustained,	predictable	coordination	that	they	require	to	function	effectively	and	produce	goods	over	time.				 This	is	the	metacoordination	problem.	Institutions	enable	us	to	solve	first	order	coordination	problems,	but	 institutions	 can	only	 function	 if	we	 solve	 the	higher	order	coordination	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 unify	 our	 practical	 stances	 towards	 institutions	themselves.	What	we	require	is	a	normative	standard	that	grants	institutions	the	space	they	 need	 to	 function	 under	 conditions	 of	 pervasive,	 reasonable	 disagreement.	Comprehensive	doctrines	of	 the	good	will	not	work	(and,	 for	 the	same	reason,	neither	will	conceptions	of	justice).	We	need	a	less	demanding	and	less	controversial	alternative	normative	standard.	Legitimacy	is	distinctive	because	it	is	able	to	play	this	role.	Legitimacy	 solves	 the	 metacoordination	 problem	 by	 identifying	 which	institutions	have	the	right	to	function.	On	the	traditional	approach,	legitimate	states	have	the	right	to	rule	and	illegitimate	states	do	not.	On	the	more	general	approach	that	I	am	following,	 legitimate	institutions	have	the	right	to	function	and	illegitimate	institutions	do	not.	This	 right	 entitles	 legitimate	 institutions	 to	make	demands	on	 individuals	 that	illegitimate	institutions	are	not	entitled	to	make:	specifically,	the	demands	that	must	be	met	for	legitimate	institutions	to	function.		We	 should	 take	 care	 that	 legitimacy	 captures	 only	 what	 institutions	 need	 and	nothing	more	(especially	not	what	they	simply	claim	they	need).	The	more	we	build	into	legitimacy,	 the	 more	 controversial	 it	 becomes	 and	 so	 the	 less	 able	 it	 is	 to	 play	 its	distinctive	 role.	 Legitimacy	 needs	 to	 be	 as	 minimalist	 as	 possible	 in	 order	 solve	 the	metacoordination	problem	under	conditions	of	deep	disagreement.		The	first	step	in	understanding	what	institutions	need	to	function	is	to	consider	how	 they	 function	 in	 general.	 Institutions	 are	 inherently	 normative,	 primarily	constituted	 by	 people	 taking	 on	 institutional	 roles	 and	 thereby	 coordinating	 their	behavior.14	Call	those	people	whom	accept	their	institutional	roles	and	so	act	according	to	 the	 institutional	 norms	 that	 define	 their	 role	 “institutional	 insiders.”15	 For	 an	institution	to	function	it	must	have	sufficiently	many	insiders	filling	a	sufficient	variety	of	roles;	a	university,	for	example,	only	functions	when	there	are	sufficient	numbers	of	both	 professors	 and	 students.	 It	 is	 only	 when	 enough	 people	 accept	 a	 variety	 of	institutional	 roles	 that	 their	actions	become	sufficiently	coordinated	 for	 institutions	 to	function	and	thereby	enable	us	to	attain	various	goods.	This	 (notably	 non-technical)	 understanding	 of	 institutions	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 view	that	legitimacy	correlates,	at	minimum,	to	a	duty	not	to	coercively	interfere	with	people	accepting	 institutional	 roles	and	being	guided	by	 institutional	norms,	 i.e.	a	duty	not	 to	coercively	 prevent	 people	 from	 being	 insiders	 to	 that	 institution.16	 Such	 interference	would	 prevent	 the	 institution	 from	 functioning,	 so	 would	 violate	 a	 legitimate	
                         14	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice,	rev.	ed.	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1999),	pp.	47-48.	15	By	acceptance,	I	mean	something	like	adopting	the	internal	point	of	view	from	H.	L.	A.	Hart,	The	Concept	
of	Law	3rd	ed.	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	p.	89.	Someone	who	accepts	a	 system	of	norms	takes	valid	norms	of	that	system	to	have	force	in	her	practical	deliberations.	I	set	aside	the	precise	nature	of	that	force	or	the	psychological	basis	of	acceptance.	16	The	“coercively”	qualifier	is	necessary	because	some	forms	of	interference	will	not	be	ruled	out,	even	for	legitimate	institutions,	depending	on	how	we	understand	interference.	One	firm	can	cause	a	rival	firm	to	close	through	justified	market	competition	without	violating	the	rival	firm’s	right	to	function.	For	ease	of	use,	I	often	refer	to	an	institution’s	right	to	function	without	interference,	where	the	“coercively”	qualifier	is	implicit.	
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institution’s	right	to	function.		When	 legitimacy	 is	 understood	 to	 include	 the	 right	 to	 non-interference,	 it	 can	play	the	role	that	we	identified	for	it	on	the	practical	approach.	There	are	many	different	institutions,	 all	 of	 which	 make	 the	 minimal	 demand	 that	 we	 not	 interfere	 with	 their	constitutive	 functioning.	 Those	 institutions	 allow	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 people	 to	 pursue	 a	wide	 range	 of	 goods.	 In	 order	 to	 enable	 that	 pursuit,	 legitimacy	 has	 a	 dual	 purpose.	Positively,	evaluations	of	legitimacy	protect	institutions	and	allow	them	to	achieve	their	aims	 without	 the	 threat	 of	 destructive	 interference.	 Negatively,	 evaluations	 of	(il)legitimacy	 identify	 which	 institutions	may	 be	 interfered	with;	 this	 negative	 role	 is	especially	 important	 because	 some	 institutions	 are	 intent	 on	 domination,	 preventing	others	from	living	together	and	pursuing	their	understanding	of	the	good.		On	my	approach,	legitimacy	answers	a	very	specific	fundamental	question:	must	
we	allow	this	institution	to	carry	on,	or	may	we	coercively	interfere	with	it?	This	question	lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 every	 theory	 of	 legitimacy;	 a	 right	 to	 rule	 would	 be	 practically	meaningless	if	the	institution	did	not	have	the	right	to	function	without	interference.	But	I	 am	 making	 a	 stronger	 claim:	 legitimacy	 is	 only	 the	 right	 to	 function	 without	interference.	(This	right	may	well	entail	further	Hohfeldian	advantages	when	applied	to	particular	 cases	 due	 to	 the	 details	 of	 how	 a	 particular	 institution	 functions.	 The	important	 point	 is	 that	 any	 further	 advantages	 follow	 only	 from	 the	 right	 to	 function	without	interference.)	Legitimacy	 is	 only	 the	 right	 to	 function	without	 interference	because	 that	 is	 all	legitimacy	 needs	 to	 be	 to	 play	 the	 practical	 role	 we	 identified	 for	 it	 in	 solving	 the	metacoordination	 problem.	 It	 enables	 us	 to	 coordinate	 our	 responses	 and	 allow	institutions	the	space	to	function;	it	does	not	guarantee	their	individual	success.	But	this	is	sufficient	because	people	are	motivated	for	a	wide	variety	of	reasons	to	contribute	to	institutions	and	secure	the	goods	that	institutional	coordination	enables.		Understanding	 legitimacy	 in	 such	 a	 minimalist	 manner	 is,	 of	 course,	 quite	controversial.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 explores	 the	 prospects	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 by	applying	 it	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 problems	 that	 the	 traditional,	 more	 robust	 approach	 that	focuses	on	state	legitimacy	is	ill-suited	to	solve.	I	put	off	application	to	the	state,	where	the	minimalist	understanding	is	most	strained,	until	the	final	section.	To	be	clear,	this	novel	understanding	of	legitimacy	does	not	on	its	own	result	in	concrete	standards	of	legitimacy	for	particular	institutions.	It	must	be	combined	with	a	robust	 understanding	 of	 the	 institutional	 context,	 importantly	 including	 how	 the	institution	relates	to	the	end	it	is	structured	to	produce.	I	say	more	about	this	below,	but	for	example:	the	state	is	often	thought	to	be	uniquely	necessary	for	the	achievement	of	morally	mandatory	aims	like	exiting	the	state	of	nature,	whereas	the	Loyal	Order	of	the	Moose	 is	only	one	among	many	 institutional	possibilities	 that	enable	us	 to	achieve	the	voluntary	 goods	 of	 socializing	 and	 networking.	 How	 an	 institution	 functions	dramatically	 impacts	 how	 we	 understand	 its	 right	 to	 function	 and	 what	 standards	 it	needs	 to	 meet	 to	 have	 that	 right.	 We	 need	 standards	 of	 legitimacy	 for	 both	 kinds	 of	institution	(some	social	clubs	are	illegitimate,	like	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	and	so	lack	a	right	to	non-interference),	but	 those	 standards	will	be	 radically	different	due	 to	 the	 important	differences	in	the	institutions	themselves.			 II.	Evaluating	Institutional	Legitimacy		Understanding	 legitimacy	 as	 the	 right	 to	 function	 leads	 us	 to	 a	 general	 strategy	 for	considering	questions	of	institutional	legitimacy.	The	important	difference	between	this	strategy	and	the	traditional	approach	is	that	I	put	aside	(for	now)	many	of	the	distinctive	
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features	of	 the	state	 that	make	state	 legitimacy	such	a	difficult	problem.	The	state,	 for	example,	 holds	 territory	 over	 which	 it	 claims	 universal	 jurisdiction	 and	 in	 which	 it	monopolizes	 coercive	 force.	 These	 features	 of	 the	 state	 are	 very	 relevant	 for	 the	question	of	state	legitimacy	but	using	them	as	a	template	for	thinking	about	legitimacy	in	general	is	misleading.	If	legitimate	institutions	have	the	right	to	function	without	coercive	interference	and	 institutions	 function	 via	 institutional	 insiders	 taking	 up	 their	 roles	 and	 acting	 on	institutional	norms,	then	we	can	analyze	legitimacy	by	examining	the	conditions	under	which	 insiders	 have	 the	 right	 to	 act	 as	 insiders	 without	 coercive	 interference.	Considered	 in	the	abstract,	accepting	the	norms	of	an	 institutional	role	and	abiding	by	them	 is	 not	 at	 all	 objectionable.	 (I	 consider	 the	 complicating	 issue	 of	 involuntary	institutional	 participants	 below.)	 Because	 insiders	 are	 simply	 individuals,	 they	 have	 a	standing	moral	right	to	non-interference	based	on	their	capacity	to	freely	exercise	their	autonomy	 and	 choose	 the	 life	 they	 wish	 to	 live	 without	 coercive	 interference.	Voluntarily	accepting	and	abiding	by	norms	 is	a	common,	 indeed	central,	part	of	all	of	our	 lives.	 Thus	 institutions	 have	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 for	 legitimacy	 simply	 because	insiders’	 voluntary	acceptance	of	 collective	norms	 is	 a	permissible	act	 that	 falls	under	their	individual	rights	of	autonomy	and	free	association.		This	 insight	 suggests	 a	 strategy	 for	 evaluating	 legitimacy	 by	drawing	 a	 parallel	between	individuals	and	institutions.	Individuals	generally	have	rights	against	coercive	interference	in	their	actions	due	to	their	autonomy	and	self-determination.	However,	in	some	circumstances	they	can	forfeit	those	rights.	For	example,	if	an	individual	attempts	to	wrongfully	harm	someone,	they	forfeit	the	right	against	coercive	interference,	thereby	becoming	liable	to	defensive	interference	and	correlatively	rendering	acts	in	defense	of	the	victim	permissible.17		Institutions	are	made	up	of	 individuals	exercising	 their	right	 to	 free	association	and	acting	on	the	basis	of	norms	they	freely	accept.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	individuals,	this	means	 that	 institutions	 generally	 have	 the	 right	 to	 pursue	 their	 activities	 without	interference.	 An	 institution’s	 right	 against	 coercive	 interference	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	individual	rights	against	coercive	interference	that	its	insiders	have.18	However,	 just	as	in	the	case	of	 individuals,	 the	 institution	can	forfeit	 these	rights.	When	it	 forfeits	 these	rights,	 the	 institution	 is	 illegitimate.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 institution	 can	 permissibly	 be	coercively	 interfered	 with	 and	 insiders	 can	 permissibly	 be	 prevented	 from	 following	institutional	norms.19		So	the	question	of	the	legitimacy	of	an	institution	becomes	the	question	of	under	what	 conditions	 a	 group	 of	 individuals	who	 have	 freely	 joined	 together	 and	 accepted	norms	to	shape	their	behavior	forfeit	their	rights	not	to	be	interfered	with	as	they	follow	those	norms.	Generally	speaking	a	necessary	condition	of	rights	forfeiture	is	some	kind	of	culpability	or	wrongdoing.	The	question,	 then,	 is	whether	the	 institution	 is	violating	rights	or	culpably	risking	violating	rights.20	The	 identification	 of	 wrongdoing	 is	 only	 the	 first	 step,	 though.	 As	 with	
                         17	See,	e.g.,	Jonathan	Quong,	“Killing	in	Self-Defense,”	Ethics,	119	(2009),	507-537.	18	 I	 say	 “a	 function	 of”	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 agnostic	 about	 whether	 the	 institutional	 right	 is	 simply	 an	agglomeration	of	individual	rights	or	if	there	is	an	emergent	collective	right	that	is	distinct.	I	want	to	avoid	the	 difficult	 questions	 of	 collective	 agency	 and	 rights	 as	 much	 as	 possible.	 That	 said,	 I	 am	 a	 value	individualist	 so	 I	 reject	 the	position	 that	 an	 institution	or	 collective	 of	 any	kind	 can	be	 an	 independent	source	of	intrinsic	value	and	have	rights	that	are	not	“a	function	of”	the	rights	of	individuals.	19	Just	as	in	the	case	of	individuals,	the	in-principle	permissibility	of	interference	does	not	entail	that	any	kind	of	interference	whatsoever	is	justified.	20	 The	 distinction	 between	wrongdoing	 and	 culpability	will	 not	matter	 for	 our	 purposes	 here,	 so	 I	will	simplify	the	discussion	by	considering	only	wrongdoing.	
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individuals,	 the	 mere	 presence	 of	 wrongdoing	 does	 not	 automatically	 forfeit	 a	 right	against	coercive	interference.	Individuals	often	have	the	right	to	do	wrong,	meaning	they	have	a	moral	right	against	the	coercive	interference	of	others	even	in	some	cases	when	they	are	acting	morally	impermissibly.21	The	individual	right	to	do	wrong	is	grounded	in	a	variety	of	concerns,	including	respect	for	autonomy	and	enabling	moral	maturation.		Institutions	also	have	a	right	to	do	wrong	in	precisely	the	sense	that	a	single	act	of	wrongdoing	does	not	necessarily	 forfeit	 their	right	against	coercive	 interference:	an	institution	 might	 be	 acting	 wrongfully	 and	 yet	 still	 be	 legitimate.	 Similar	 concerns	ground	the	 institutional	right	 to	do	wrong	as	ground	the	 individual	right	 to	do	wrong.	First,	the	individual	right	to	do	wrong	of	institutional	insiders	and	the	respect	due	their	autonomous	 choices	 surely	 secures,	 to	 some	degree,	 the	 right	 to	 do	wrong	 in	 concert	with	others.	Second,	and	related	 to	moral	maturation,	 institutions	need	space	 to	make	mistakes	and	reform	as	they	attempt	to	tackle	difficult	problems;	the	costs	of	allowing	coercive	 interference	 in	 any	 institution	 that	 made	 a	 mistake	 are	 prohibitive	 under	conditions	 of	 fallibility	 and	 would	 make	 achieving	 any	 complex	 and	 important	 aim	impossible.22	 Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 there	 are	 different	 kinds	 of	 coercive	interference.	Wrongdoing	might	result	in	an	institution	forfeiting	rights	against	punitive	interference	without	also	forfeiting	its	right	to	function	more	generally.		To	 sum	 up:	 legitimate	 institutions	 have	 a	 right	 to	 function	 that	 correlates	 to	 a	duty	of	non-interference.	As	with	individuals,	this	right	to	non-interference	can	be	forfeit	if	the	institution	commits	sufficiently	egregious	wrongs	(although	not	any	wrong	will	do,	given	the	right	to	do	wrong).	If	we	apply	this	to	some	particular	cases,	we	see	that	this	notion	of	institutional	legitimacy	is	both	plausible	and	informative.			 An	opening	caveat:	you	may	well	disagree	with	my	evaluations	of	these	particular	cases.	I	motivate	my	claims	to	some	degree,	but	the	overall	point	of	considering	cases	is	to	confirm	that	we	require	assessments	of	legitimacy	for	all	sorts	of	institutions	and	that	in	 making	 such	 assessments	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 think	 about	 how	 and	 to	 what	 extent	institutions	act	wrongfully	and	so	potentially	 forfeit	 rights.	Claiming,	 for	example,	 that	one	 of	 the	 institutions	 I	 cast	 as	 legitimate	 is	 in	 fact	 illegitimate	 already	 accepts	 the	underlying	purpose	of	the	examples.	To	 begin,	 institutions	 that	 do	 not	 violate	 rights	 are	 obviously	 legitimate.	 These	are	just	groups	of	people	voluntarily	associating	without	harming	anyone,	so	interfering	with	them	would	be	wrong.	Examples	would	include	a	private	social	club,	a	local	grocery	co-op,	the	temple	on	the	corner,	and	so	on.	We	may	disagree	with	how	they	operate	and	we	may	engage	them	in	dialog	or	even	protest,	but	they	have	a	right	not	to	be	coercively	interfered	 with.	 We	 cannot	 physically	 bar	 members	 from	 meeting	 together	 or	 from	carrying	out	their	institutional	roles,	we	cannot	threaten	violence	to	deter	them,	and	so	on.	 These	 institutions	 are	 so	 anodyne	 that	 the	 question	 of	 legitimacy	 may	 seem	misplaced,	supporting	the	traditional	approach	of	restricting	judgments	of	legitimacy	to	political	 institutions.	 My	 interpretation	 is	 that	 these	 institutions	 are	 so	 obviously	legitimate	 in	the	sense	we	are	pursuing	that	we	(almost)	never	explicitly	entertain	the	question	of	their	legitimacy.	If	we	move	our	attention	to	institutions	that	are	prima	facie	morally	suspect,	it	becomes	clear	why	concerns	of	legitimacy	are	appropriately	applied	to	non-political	institutions.	Consider	four	such	institutions:	a	criminal	organization	like	the	 mob,	 a	 maker	 of	 ultraviolent	 films,	 the	 Ku	 Klux	 Klan,	 and	 a	 golf	 club	 with	 racist	
                         21	Jeremy	Waldron,	“A	Right	to	Do	Wrong,”	Ethics,	92	(1981),	21-39;	David	Enoch,	“A	Right	to	Violate	One’s	Duty,”	Law	and	Philosophy,	21	(2002),	355-384.		22	 Buchanan,	 The	 Heart	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 p.	 182.	 Compare	 John	 Rawls,	 Political	 Liberalism	 (New	 York;	Columbia	University	Press,	1993),	pp.	427-428.	
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membership	policies.	All	four	are	morally	condemnable	in	a	variety	of	ways,	but	are	they	illegitimate?		The	 point	 at	 which	 wrongdoing	 results	 in	 the	 forfeiture	 of	 the	 right	 to	 non-interference	is	not	the	same	for	all	institutions	or	in	all	contexts.	Most	importantly,	it	has	to	be	balanced	against	the	institution’s	goal.	An	institution	that	is	uniquely	necessary	for	a	morally	mandatory	goal	will	have	more	leeway	than	an	institution	pursuing	a	purely	elective	goal.	There	is	not	much	room	for	rights	violations	when	pursuing	elective	ends.		For	all	four	institutions	under	consideration,	the	institutional	goal	is	elective.	But	I	think	there	is	an	important	difference	between	the	mob	and	KKK	on	one	hand	and	the	film	 maker	 and	 golf	 club	 on	 the	 other.	 While	 the	 latter	 institutions	 are	 morally	condemnable	 in	 important	ways,	 neither	directly	uses	 violence	 to	harm	others,	 unlike	the	former	institutions:	the	mob	and	the	KKK	use	violence,	including	murder,	to	achieve	their	 institutional	 goals.	 Just	 as	 people	 who	 use	 violence	 of	 this	 sort	 to	 achieve	 their	private	 aims	 forfeit	 their	 rights	 against	 interference,	 these	 institutions	 forfeit	 their	rights.	Both	the	mob	and	the	KKK	are	clearly	illegitimate.		To	emphasize,	on	my	approach	this	means	the	mob	and	the	KKK	1)	lack	rights	to	function	and	to	pursue	their	institutional	goals,	so	2)	others	correlatively	lack	a	duty	of	non-interference,	 meaning	 that	 3)	 it	 is	 permissible	 to	 coercively	 interfere	 with	 these	institutions	 and	 their	 members,	 thereby	 preventing	 the	 members	 from	 coordinating	their	action	by	 following	 institutional	norms,	ultimately	resulting	 in	the	dismantling	of	the	institutions	such	that	they	no	longer	exist.23	These	implications	speak	in	favor	of	understanding	legitimacy	in	the	general	way	we	 are	 pursuing.	 By	 identifying	 the	 mob	 and	 the	 KKK	 as	 illegitimate,	 we	 easily	 and	accurately	 characterize	 the	 appropriate	 relationship	 between	 these	 institutions	 and	outsiders	by	unifying	an	 important	set	of	practical	 stances	we	can	 take	 towards	 them.	We	are	doing	more	than	condemning	individuals;	we	are	identifying	a	relevant	feature	of	 the	 institution	as	 a	whole	 and	 coordinating	our	 responses	 around	 that	 institutional	status.	What	of	the	maker	of	ultraviolent	films	and	the	racist	golf	club?	I	think	both	are	legitimate.	 Again,	 to	 be	 absolutely	 clear,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 they	 are	 morally	praiseworthy,	 or	 that	 we	 should	 not	 organize	 and	 protest	 against	 them,	 or	 that	 they	should	not	reform,	or	even	that	they	are	not	violating	some	rights	and	acting	wrongfully	(given	 the	 right	 to	 do	 wrong).	 Members	 of	 the	 golf	 club	 and	 employees	 of	 the	 film	company	may	be	morally	condemnable,	but	we	cannot	use	coercion	to	stop	them	from	carrying	 out	 their	 role	 in	 their	 institutions.	 Legitimacy	 only	 entails	 the	 very	 minimal	claim	 that	 the	 institution	 has	 a	 right	 to	 function	 and	 so	 others	 have	 a	 duty	 not	 to	
                         23	 In	 the	 case	 of	 domestic	 institutions	 like	 these,	 the	 question	 of	 legitimacy	most	 often	 gets	 subsumed	under	(although	is	not	identical	to)	their	legality.	A	major	function	of	domestic	legal	systems	is	to	establish	shared	 and	 settled	 standards	 for	 legitimate	 domestic	 institutions	 like	 businesses	 or	 clubs,	 which	 then	allows	us	 to	coordinate	our	behavior	around	 those	standards	and	gain	 the	goods	of	 stable	coordination	over	time.	This	is	all	perfectly	consistent	with	applying	legitimacy	standards	to	such	institutions.	One	way	of	thinking	about	the	issue	is	that	from	the	perspective	of	legislators,	we	need	to	consider	what	standards	institutions	need	to	meet	to	have	rights	to	non-interference.	But	the	issues	are	still	distinct;	the	KKK	was	morally	 illegitimate	 even	 when	 it	 was	 legal.	 This	 highlights	 a	 major	 reason	 why	 questions	 of	 state	legitimacy	and	the	legitimacy	of	supranational	institutions	are	distinctly	difficult:	our	usual	solution	to	the	metacoordination	 problem,	 namely	 the	 settled	 standards	 of	 a	 particular	 legal	 regime,	 is	 problematic	outside	 the	domestic	 context.	We	need	ways	of	 assessing	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	multitude	of	 institutions	beyond	the	state	even	in	the	face	of	fundamental	questions	about	the	status,	normative	grounding,	scope,	and	 enforcement	 of	 international	 law.	 This	 is	 further	 complicated	 by	my	 focus	 on	 rights	 violations,	 as	some	rights	depend	on	political	institutions	to	give	them	determinate	content,	so	in	some	contexts	aspects	of	moral	 legitimacy	 cannot	 be	 assessed	 independently	 of	 positive	 law.	 Thanks	 to	 Antoinette	 Scherz	 for	helping	me	clarify	my	thinking	on	this	issue.	
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coercively	interfere	with	it.	Legitimacy	is	a	relatively	low	bar,	as	it	needs	to	be	to	serve	its	practical	function	under	conditions	of	disagreement.		This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 these	 institutions	would	 be	 legitimate	 in	 all	 circumstances.	 I	follow	 Buchanan	 in	 holding	 that	 the	 details	 of	 how	 institutions	 work	 in	 their	 actual	context	matters	 for	 their	 legitimacy	(his	 “ecological”	approach	 to	 legitimacy).	But	with	the	 background	 conditions	 of	 a	 modern,	 relatively	 just	 state,	 institutions	 and	institutional	 insiders	 have	 the	 right	 to	 act	 in	 some	 morally	 pernicious	 ways	 without	coercive	 interference,	 just	 like	 individuals	have	a	right	against	coercive	 interference	 in	their	private	lives	even	when	they	are	misogynist	and	racist.	It	is	only	when	those	views	cross	a	line	into	sufficiently	egregious	rights	violations	that	the	right	to	non-interference	is	forfeit.	Even	 if	 you	 disagree	 with	 my	 conclusions	 in	 a	 particular	 case,	 the	 examples	demonstrate	 the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 approach.	 It	 makes	 sense	 both	 to	 evaluate	 the	legitimacy	of	institutions	that	are	not	political	and	to	think	about	legitimacy	in	terms	of	a	right	 to	 non-interference	 that	 can	 be	 forfeit	 by	 wrongdoing.	 Legitimacy	 identifies	 an	important	way	 that	we	 coordinate	 our	 practical	 stances	 to	 such	 institutions	 and	 their	actions.			 III.	Political	Legitimacy		This	 understanding	 of	 legitimacy	 has	 three	 important	 implications	 for	 questions	 of	political	legitimacy.	The	first	implication	is	that	the	idea	of	political	legitimacy	as	a	single	standard	 should	 be	 abandoned.	 Second,	 my	 focus	 on	 rights	 violations	 avoids	 some	problems	 that	 have	 plagued	 normative	 evaluations	 of	 political	 institutions,	 especially	international	 institutions.	 Third,	 the	 main	 issue	 for	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 many	 political	institutions	is	their	use	of	coercion	because	coercion	prima	facie	violates	rights.		First,	 focusing	 on	 the	 goals	 of	 an	 institution	 and	 whether	 it	 violates	 rights	immediately	reveals	that	the	category	of	“political”	is	too	diverse	for	political	legitimacy	to	be	usefully	 evaluated	 in	 any	unified	manner.	The	goals	of	political	 institutions	vary	widely,	 from	 the	 broad	 and	morally	 mandatory	 goals	 of	 the	 state	 to	 the	 narrow	 and	elective	 goals	 of	 institutions	 like	 the	 International	 Standards	 Organization.	 Some	political	 institutions	 issue	 rules,	 use	 coercion	 to	 back	 those	 rules	 up,	 and	 wield	 the	power	 to	 kill	 literally	 all	 human	 life,	 but	 most	 do	 not.	 Accordingly,	 the	 potential	 and	actual	 impact	 of	 these	 institutions	 varies	 widely	 as	 well.	 No	 single	 standard	 could	appropriately	 evaluate	 institutions	 that	 differ	 so	 substantially	 across	 the	 features	relevant	for	institutional	legitimacy.	 	Of	course,	there	is	still	room	on	my	account	for	standards	of	legitimacy	that	apply	to	 types	 of	 institutions.	 But	 the	 types	 will	 be	 fine-grained,	 focused	 on	 the	 goals	 and	functions	of	 institutions.	Plausibly,	one	of	 these	 types	would	be	 the	state,	given	states’	common	goals	and	shared	ways	of	functioning.	Many	theorists	are	already	proceeding	in	this	 more	 fine-grained	 manner	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 details	 of	 particular	 institutions	 or	institutional	types	and	developing	novel	standards	for	them.	My	approach	unifies	these	various	projects	by	giving	them	a	single	focus	in	the	form	of	a	common	understanding	of	legitimacy:	 these	 different	 standards	 all	 aim	 to	 show	 under	 what	 conditions	 the	institution	 has	 the	 right	 to	 function	 without	 coercive	 interference.	 But	 we	 should	abandon	the	idea	of	a	single	standard	of	political	legitimacy.	A	second	important	implication	of	my	approach	to	institutional	legitimacy	is	that	a	 focus	 on	 rights	 helps	 us	 avoid	 certain	 conceptual	 and	 definitional	 morasses.	 Most	relevantly,	 there	 is	 the	 question	 of	what	 it	means	 to	 rule	 (or,	what	 is	 often	 identified	
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with	 rule,	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 political).24	 Some	 international	 political	 institutions	 do	something	 that	 looks	 like	 ruling	 because	 they	 issue	 statements	 or	 decisions	 that	prescribe	 actions	 for	 agents,	 like	 the	 United	 Nations.	 But	 these	 institutions	 do	 not	coercively	 impose	 their	 decisions	 in	 the	 way	 that	 states	 do.	 Do	 these	 international	institutions	 rule	 or	 not?	On	 some	 accounts	 of	 legitimacy	 this	will	matter	 a	 great	 deal,	most	obviously	if	 legitimacy	is	conceived	of	as	the	right	to	rule.	If	these	institutions	do	not	rule,	then	the	question	of	their	legitimacy	is	misplaced.		On	my	account,	on	the	other	hand,	we	can	forego	the	question	of	whether	these	institutions	 rule.	 Instead	we	 ask	 if	 their	 activity,	 whether	 it	 counts	 as	 ruling	 in	 some	specific	sense	or	not,	is	violating	rights	and	how	that	activity	relates	to	the	institution’s	constitutive	goals.	The	question	of	rights	violations	is	independent	of	both	the	question	of	ruling	and	the	question	of	coercive	enforcement	of	decisions.		To	 see	 this,	 consider	 the	 case	 of	 a	 massively	 influential	 yet	 purely	 advisory	institution.	 As	 an	 advisory	 institution	 it	 issues	 recommendations	 about	 how	everyone	ought	 to	 live,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 take	 itself	 to	 be	 issuing	 commands	 and	 its	recommendations	are	not	coercively	enforced.25	However,	almost	everyone	voluntarily	does	what	the	advisory	institution	recommends	that	they	do.	Ultimately	this	means	that	the	institution’s	advice	drastically	shapes	society	and	people’s	life	prospects.		If	 one	 of	 those	 recommendations	 is	 that	 women	 should	 not	 work	 outside	 the	home,	 then	 most	 women	 would	 choose	 not	 to	 work	 outside	 the	 home.	 But	 this	 also	dramatically	affects	the	few	women	who	do	not	follow	the	institution’s	advice.	For	they	find	barriers	when	potential	employers	discount	them,	they	find	cultural	stigma	against	women	who	do	not	follow	the	advice	and	related	resultant	stigma	about	their	abilities,	they	find	a	lack	of	educational	opportunities,	and	so	on.	In	this	case,	the	legitimacy	of	the	institution	is	in	question	because	of	the	effects	it	has	even	though	it	does	not	issue	rules	in	the	strict	sense	and	even	though	it	does	not	coercively	enforce	its	advice.	The	fact	that	almost	 everyone	 follows	 its	 advice	 and	 so	 society	 is	 structured	 in	 a	 way	 that	systematically	violates	rights	is	enough	for	its	legitimacy	to	be	at	stake.		My	 approach,	 then,	 appropriately	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 legitimacy	 for	 such	institutions	without	having	to	solve,	or	even	consider,	a	thorny	conceptual	question	that	other	 approaches	may	 struggle	 to	 resolve.	 This	 point	 extends	 to	 concepts	 other	 than	ruling,	 including	 the	 particularly	 relevant	 concept	 of	 law.	 There	 has	 long	 been	 debate	about	whether	international	law	is	“really”	law.26	International	law	lacks	some	features	that	 are	 claimed	 to	 be	 constitutive	 of	 law	 on	 various	 accounts,	 such	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 a	sovereign,	 the	 lack	of	 enforcement	mechanisms,	 or	 the	 largely	 voluntary	 subjection	of	states.	On	my	approach	whether	international	law	is	really	law	does	not	matter	for	the	question	of	 international	 law’s	 legitimacy.27	What	matters	 are	 the	goals	of	 the	various	institutions	of	international	law	and	the	ways	those	institutions	affect	individuals,	most	
                         24	Many	theorists	grapple	with	the	notion	of	ruling	as	they	consider	legitimacy	in	the	international	context,	including	Thomas	Christiano,	“The	Legitimacy	of	International	Institutions,”	The	Routledge	Companion	to	
the	 Philosophy	 of	 Law,	 ed.	 by	 Andrei	 Marmor,	 (New	 York:	 Taylor	 and	 Francis,	 2012),	 pp.	 380-393;	Tasioulas,	 “The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Law;”	 Buchanan,	 “The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Law;”	Besson,	“The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil.”		25	As	described,	 this	 institution	does	not	 command	 in	 the	 tradition	of	Hart	and	Raz,	 according	 to	which	commands	 necessarily	 include	 the	 intention	 that	 subjects	 do	 as	 commanded	 because	 they	 were	commanded	 to.	 Thus	 it	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	 ruling	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 this	 strain	 of	 the	 literature	understands	it.		26	 See,	 e.g.,	 Hart,	 The	 Concept	 of	 Law,	 ch.	 10;	 Joshua	 Kleinfeld,	 “Skeptical	 Internationalism:	 A	 Study	 of	Whether	 International	 Law	 is	 Law,”	 Fordham	 Law	 Review,	 78	 (2010),	 2451-2530;	 Tasioulas,	 “The	Legitimacy	of	International	Law;”	Dworkin,	“A	New	Philosophy	for	International	Law.”	27	The	question	of	rights	violations	intersects	with	some	of	the	same	issues	like	the	lack	of	enforcement,	but	it	can	be	evaluated	without	answering	the	conceptual	question.	
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especially	whether	they	commit	or	enable	rights	violations.28		Of	 course	evaluating	 the	 effects	of	 these	 institutions	 is	 incredibly	difficult,	 as	 is	bringing	those	effects	into	relation	with	the	various	institutional	goals	and	determining	what	 sort	of	 right	 to	do	wrong	 those	goals	 should	 support.29	The	point	 is	not	 that	my	approach	 easily	 gives	 concrete	 answers.	 The	 point	 is	 that	 it	 avoids	 some	 difficult	questions	that	other	accounts	struggle	to	resolve	and	that,	in	my	view,	distract	us	from	more	important	issues.	A	 third	 implication	 of	my	 approach	 for	 political	 legitimacy	 is	 that	much	 of	 our	focus	should	be	on	how	institutions	use	their	power.	The	use	of	power	in	its	many	forms	is	how	political	institutions	are	most	likely	to	violate	rights	and	the	most	egregious	and	widespread	violations	of	rights	are	a	result	of	the	abuse	of	coercive	force.	This	is	not	a	particularly	surprising	or	novel	position.	I	highlight	it	here	for	two	reasons.		First,	this	puts	my	approach	in	the	camp	that	includes	John	Rawls,	who	notes	that	political	power	“is	always	coercive	power”	and	takes	his	liberal	principle	of	legitimacy	to	be	setting	the	conditions	under	which	such	coercive	power	is	justifiably	exercised.30	The	other	 camp	 takes	 the	main	problem	 for	political	 legitimacy	 to	be	whether	 institutions	have	 justified	moral	 authority,	 i.e.	 the	moral	 power	 to	 change	 others’	moral	 standing	simply	by	 stating	 an	 intention	 to	do	 so.	The	 authority	 camp	 includes	 Joseph	Raz,	who	frames	the	problem	as	the	question	of	“legitimate	authority.”31	My	 approach	 focuses	 on	 coercion	 because	 it	 is	 primarily	 through	 the	 use	 of	coercion	that	institutions	violate	and	threaten	to	violate	people’s	rights,	so	it	is	the	use	of	coercion	 that	primarily	delegitimizes.	 In	 contrast,	 claiming	 to	 exercise	 authority	while	not	having	that	authority	does	not	violate	anyone’s	rights.	It	is	only	when	that	authority	is	coercively	enforced	that	rights	violations	are	possible	(or	when	it	is	widely	accepted	so	the	coercion	is	structural	rather	than	interactional,	as	in	the	above	example).	It	seems	to	me	that	focusing	on	an	institution’s	claim	to	authority	leads	us	to	misunderstand	the	relationship	between	authority	and	legitimacy.32	Consider	the	many	religious	groups	that	claim	moral	authority	over	all	humans.	They	claim	to	issue	rules	(and	interpretations	of	rules)	that	bind	all	people,	such	that	not	following	those	rules	is	morally	wrongful.	Is	every	religious	leader	(that	makes	this	kind	of	universal	claim)	violating	the	rights	of	those	around	them?	I	think	not.	They	may	be	criticizable	on	areteic	grounds	 like	respect.	But	 they	are	not	violating	rights	simply	by	asserting	 authority	 over	 others,	 given	 that	 they	do	not	 force	people	 to	 follow	 them.	 If	they	cross	the	line	from	exhortation	and	condemnation	to	coercion,	they	violate	rights.	Analogously,	 the	main	problem	 for	 the	 legitimacy	of	an	 institution	 like	 the	state	 is	not	
                         28	Cf.	Besson,	“The	Authority	of	International	Law	–	Lifting	the	State	Veil.”	29	Note	that	the	question	of	whether	international	law	is	really	law	may	well	be	relevant	for	a	host	of	other	interesting,	important	questions,	perhaps	even	some	questions	of	moral	evaluation.		30	 Rawls,	Political	 Liberalism,	 p.	 136.	 This	 camp	 also	 includes	Altman	 and	Wellman,	A	Liberal	 Theory	 of	
International	 Justice;	Ladenson,	“In	Defense	of	a	Hobbesian	Conception	of	Law;”	Robert	Nozick,	Anarchy,	
State,	and	Utopia	 (New	York:	Basic	Books,	1974),	p.	 xi;	Ronald	Dworkin,	Law’s	Empire	 (Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	1986),	pp.	190-191;	Thomas	Nagel,	“Moral	Conflict	and	Political	Legitimacy,”	Philosophy	&	
Public	Affairs,	16	(1987),	215-240	at	p.	218;	Niko	Kolodny,	“Rule	Over	None	I:	What	Justifies	Democracy?”	
Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs,	42	(2014),	195-229	at	p.	197.	31	The	main	 locus	 of	Raz’s	 thought	 on	 this	 is	The	Morality	 of	 Freedom.	 Others	who	 follow	 the	 authority	approach	 include	 Green,	 The	 Authority	 of	 the	 State;	 Tasioulas,	 “The	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Law;”	Higgott	 and	 Erman,	 “Deliberative	 global	 governance	 and	 the	 question	 of	 legitimacy:	what	 can	we	 learn	from	 the	 WTO?”;	 Besson,	 “The	 Authority	 of	 International	 Law	 –	 Lifting	 the	 State	 Veil;”	 Christiano,	“Democratic	Legitimacy	and	International	Institutions.”	32	 For	 more	 on	 why	 legitimacy	 and	 (justified)	 authority	 are	 not	 identical,	 see	 Morris,	 An	 Essay	 on	 the	
Modern	State,	 ch.	4	and	Bas	van	der	Vossen,	 “On	Legitimacy	and	Authority:	A	Response	 to	Krehoff,”	Res	
Publica,	14	(2008),	299-302.	
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that	 it	 claims	authority.	The	main	problem	 is	 that	 it	 backs	up	 its	 claims	with	 coercive	force.		 There	 are	 further	 important	 and	 interesting	questions	 to	 ask	 about	both	 states	and	religious	institutions,	including	whether	they	have	the	authority	they	claim.	Indeed,	that	question	is	one	of	the	most	 important	practical	questions	people	face.	My	claim	is	not	 that	 other	 questions	 are	 unimportant;	my	 claim	 is	 that	 they	 are	 distinct	 from	 the	question	 of	 the	 institution’s	 legitimacy.	 It	 is	 both	 consistent	 and	 useful	 to	 think	 that	whether	some	religious	institution	has	the	right	to	function	is	distinct	from	whether	the	religion	it	promulgates	is	true.	The	 second	 reason	 that	 I	 am	 highlighting	 the	 important	 role	 of	 coercion	 in	considering	 political	 legitimacy	 on	 my	 approach	 is	 that	 so	 far	 I	 have	 been	 treating	institutions	of	all	kinds	as	if	they	were	purely	voluntary.	Institutional	insiders,	as	I	define	them,	are	people	who	voluntarily	accept	institutional	norms.	This	may	have	struck	you	as	odd	since	many	political	 institutions	demand	that	people	 follow	institutional	norms	even	 if	 they	do	not	accept	 those	norms.	When	 those	 institutions	use	 coercion	 to	 force	compliance	with	institutional	norms,	we	have	a	very	different	situation.		The	voluntary	case	is	the	baseline	from	which	we	come	to	understand	the	nature	of	institutions	and	the	core	of	institutional	legitimacy.	But	as	I	am	now	emphasizing,	this	does	 not	 mean	 that	 coercion	 and	 non-voluntariness	 are	 irrelevant	 for	 institutional	legitimacy—quite	 the	 opposite.	 Institutions	 that	 coerce	 compliance	 with	 their	 norms	need	 to	 meet	 considerably	 more	 stringent	 standards	 for	 legitimacy	 because	 coercing	people	 is	 prima	 facie	 rights-violating.33	 At	 the	 very	 least	 such	 institutions	 will	 be	legitimate	 only	 if	 they	 are	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 a	morally	mandatory	 goal.	 No	 purely	elective	goals	could	justify	coercion	of	this	sort.	Here	 the	 question	 of	 authority	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 relevant.	 Too	 briefly:	 on	 my	approach	 coercion	 can	 only	 delegitimize	 if	 the	 coercion	 is	 wrongful.	 One	 way	 that	coercion	 can	 be	 permissible	 is	 if	 a	 normative	 authority	 has	 changed	 under	 what	conditions	 citizens	may	 be	 coerced.	 Any	 institution	 that	 uses	 coercion	 over	 as	wide	 a	range	of	activities	and	on	as	many	occasions	as	the	modern	state	probably	needs	some	kind	 of	 normative	 authority	 regarding	 coercion	 in	 order	 to	 be	 legitimate.	 But	 that	 is	because	authority	can	be	relevant	to	rights	violations	and	the	permissibility	of	coercion,	not	because	legitimacy	simply	is	legitimate	authority.34		 IV.	State	Legitimacy		Finally,	 my	 understanding	 of	 legitimacy	 can	 be	 consistently	 and	 fruitfully	 applied	 to	states.	 This	 application	 is	 complex	 and	 I	 do	 not	 have	 the	 space	 to	 address	 the	many	issues	 it	 raises.	 At	 this	 point	 I	wish	 simply	 to	make	 a	 preliminary	 and	 plausible	 case.	Importantly,	my	general	approach	to	institutional	legitimacy	aligns	well	with	the	recent	turn	away	from	political	obligation	in	theories	of	state	legitimacy.35		 Understood	as	 the	 right	 to	 function	without	 coercive	 interference,	 the	question	for	state	legitimacy	is	how	states	function	and	what	non-interference	in	that	functioning	entails.	 While	 the	 function	 of	 states	 is	 much	 contested,	 most	 fundamentally	 states	function	by	issuing	and	enforcing	laws.	This	is	what	enables	them	to	establish	the	basic	
                         33	Cf.	Dworkin,	“A	New	Philosophy	for	International	Law,”	p.	14.	34	 This	 opens	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 state	may	 have	 the	 authority	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 legitimate	 yet	 not	 have	anywhere	near	the	authority	it	claims,	as	I	believe	is	often	true.	Cf.	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State;	William	 A.	 Edmundson,	 “Legitimate	 Authority	 without	 Political	 Obligation,”	 Law	 And	 Philosophy,	 17	(1998),	43-60,	at	p.	60.	35	Examples	 include	Applbaum,	“Legitimacy	without	 the	Duty	 to	Obey”	and	Reglitz,	 “Political	Legitimacy	Without	a	(Claim-)	Right	to	Rule.”	
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structure	of	society,	provide	public	goods,	and	so	on.	State	legitimacy	on	my	view	is	thus	a	right	to	issue	and	enforce	laws	without	interference.	The	important	question	is	what	this	right	further	entails	given	the	peculiar	nature	of	state	functioning.		I	 do	not	need	 to	 answer	 this	question	here	because	we	 can	 see	 some	plausible	possibilities	by	turning	to	recent	revisionist	theories	of	state	legitimacy.36	For	example,	William	A.	Edmundson	argues	that	state	legitimacy	should	be	understood	as	correlating	to	 “a	 general	 prima	 facie	 duty	 not	 to	 interfere	with	 [laws’]	 enforcement”	 and	 “not	 to	interfere	 with	 the	 bona	 fide	 administration	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 a	 just	 state.”37	 Jiafeng	 Zhu	claims	that	state	legitimacy	need	only	entail	a	liberty	to	create	and	apply	law,	a	liberty	to	enforce	the	law,	a	power	to	make	subjects	vulnerable	to	coercive	enforcement	of	the	law,	and	a	claim-right	to	monopolize	the	three	former	Hohfeldian	advantages.38	Christopher	W.	Morris	holds	that	“for	most	people,	this	right	to	rule	will	correlate	with	an	obligation	to	 refrain	 from	 interfering	 with	 the	 state’s	 actions.”39	 The	 important	 point	 for	 these	revisionist	theories	is	that	state	legitimacy	need	not	correlate	to	a	robust	duty	to	obey	or	even	 to	Buchanan’s	weaker	 “special	 kind	of	 respect.”40	They	demonstrate	 that	 various	amenably	minimalist	approaches	to	state	legitimacy	are	already	extant	in	the	literature.	This	is	sufficient	for	my	purpose	of	establishing	the	prima	facie	plausibility	of	applying	my	general	account	of	institutional	legitimacy,	with	its	focus	on	non-interference,	to	the	state.	 I	cannot	consider	the	many	arguments	made	by	Edmundson,	Zhu,	and	others	in	support	 of	 a	 minimalist	 understanding	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 why	 states	 do	 not	 require	more.41	That	said,	I	will	add	one:	any	legitimate	state	will	in	fact	have	all	the	support	it	requires	without	anything	more	than	non-interference	because	all	legitimate	states	have	de	facto	authority.	That	is,	every	theory	of	state	legitimacy	requires	that	the	state	have	the	 voluntary	 support	 of	 most	 of	 the	 citizenry,	 such	 that	 most	 citizens	 voluntarily	comply	with	most	laws	most	of	the	time.42	If	they	did	not,	the	state	would	have	to	apply	stunningly	widespread	 coercive	 force	 in	 order	 to	 function.	But	wielding	 such	 coercive	force	 is	 both	unacceptably	 risky	 to	 citizens’	 rights	 and	unlikely	 to	 be	 effective,	 so	 any	state	that	needs	to	wield	such	force	in	order	to	function	is	ipso	facto	illegitimate.	When	states	 have	 de	 facto	 authority,	 they	 will	 have	 enough	 resources	 to	 function	 without	making	any	further	demands.		This,	of	course,	dodges	the	question	of	whether	people	should	accept	their	state’s	broad	claims	to	authority.	I	purposefully	dodge	this	question	precisely	because	I	do	not	think	 it	 is	well	 answered	 by	 a	 theory	 of	 legitimacy.	 This	marks	 one	 of	 the	 distinctive	elements	of	my	account.	Often	the	question	of	legitimacy	is	bound	up	with	questions	of	
                         36	 I	 borrow	 the	 ‘revisionist’	 label	 from	 Jiafeng	 Zhu,	 “Farewell	 to	 Political	 Obligation:	 In	 Defense	 of	 a	Permissive	Conception	of	Legitimacy,”	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly	(2015),	doi:	10.111/papq.12128,	at	p.	2.	37	Edmundson,	“Legitimate	Authority	without	Political	Obligation,”	p.	44.	38	Zhu,	“Farewell	to	Political	Obligation,”	pp.	3-4.	39	Morris,	An	Essay	on	the	Modern	State,	p.	216.	40	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	p.	184. 41	These	theories,	as	well	as	my	own,	are	intended	to	offer	a	theory	of	“internal”	legitimacy,	as	opposed	to	“external”	or	recognitional	legitimacy,	which	concerns	how	outsiders	should	treat	states.	It	is	worth	noting	that,	because	I	do	not	start	with	the	state,	I	use	the	terms	‘insider’	and	‘outsider’	in	a	different	manner	than	the	 state-centric	 discussion.	 My	 distinction	 is	 about	 who	 willingly	 joins	 institutions;	 the	 traditional	distinction	is	between	addressees	of	the	state	and	others.	I	am	offering	an	account	of	“internal”	legitimacy	because	many	 addressees	 of	 the	 state	 are	 outsiders	 according	 to	my	 usage,	 and	 it	 is	 to	 them	 that	 the	problem	of	legitimacy	as	I	understand	it	applies.	Terminology	aside,	the	important	point	is	that	I	take	non-interference	to	capture	what	many	citizens	of	modern	states	owe	to	their	states. 42	 See	 Tom	 R.	 Tyler,	Why	 People	 Obey	 the	 Law	 (Princeton:	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	 2006)	 for	 the	argument	that	it	is	not	the	threat	of	coercion	that	motivates	most	people’s	law-abiding	behavior.		
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good	citizenship,	 identity,	 loyalty,	 fairness,	 respect,	 and	a	host	of	other	moral	 issues.43	These	 are	 important	 issues	 and	 they	 are	 extremely	 relevant	 for	 how	we	 relate	 to	 the	various	 institutions	 that	make	 claims	 on	 us.	My	 point	 is	 simply	 that	 they	 are	 distinct	from	the	question	of	legitimacy.	Notice	 that	 I	 am	 not	 claiming	 that	 the	 people	 who	 support	 the	 state,	 thus	establishing	 its	de	 facto	authority,	 are	mistaken.	The	existence	of	a	 traditional	general	political	obligation	 is	only	one	among	many	good	reasons	 that	people	have	 to	support	the	state.	Many	people	contribute	to	the	state	out	of	a	sense	of	shared	history,	solidarity,	personal	 loyalty,	 fairness,	 and	 so	 on.	 Some	 states	 may	 very	 well	 deserve	 these	contributions	from	some	citizens	 for	precisely	these	reasons.	My	approach	does	not	 in	any	way	exclude	those	possibilities.	As	 I	 noted	 in	 section	one,	 on	my	approach	 legitimacy	picks	 out	 a	 single	 salient	issue:	must	we	allow	this	institution	to	continue?	By	narrowing	the	question	we	are	able	to	 focus	 on	 the	 relevant	 concerns	 more	 closely	 and	 without	 distraction	 while	 also	inviting	 other	moral	 issues	 to	 be	 addressed	 independently.	 Of	 course,	we	might	 hope	that	 legitimacy	 is	relevant	 in	some	ways	to	 these	other	discussions,	but	we	should	not	treat	them	as	if	they	were	identical.		Here	 I	 am	 following	 A.	 John	 Simmons’	 general	 strategy	 in	 “Justification	 and	Legitimacy.”44	 Simmons	 argues	 that	 Kantian	 views	 of	 legitimacy	 like	 Rawls’	 collapse	legitimacy	into	justification.	For	Simmons,	justification	is	a	consequentialist	assessment	of	 the	 state	 that	 asks	 whether	 there	 are	 strong	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 the	 state	 qua	institutional	 type	 over	 anarchy.	 Legitimacy	 is	 a	more	 robust	 assessment	 on	 Simmons’	view:	 it	 applies	 to	 individual	 state	 tokens	 and	 asks	 whether	 they	 have	 the	 rights	 to	direct,	to	coerce,	and	to	be	obeyed.		I	 accept	 Simmons’	 distinction	 between	 justification	 and	 legitimacy	 but	 I	 go	further.45	Collapsing	justification	into	legitimacy	disguises	important	moral	distinctions,	as	Simmons	claims,	but	so	does	including	everything	else	in	legitimacy.	Simmons’	notion	of	legitimacy	encompasses	a	host	of	different	issues	that	I	think	are	better	distinguished	and	 evaluated	 independently.	 Simmons’	 ultimate	 concern	 is	 with	 political	 obligation,	understood	to	include	a	variety	of	robust	requirements	like	generality	and	particularity.	If	 we	 take	 legitimacy	 to	 be	 answering	 different	 concerns,	 namely	 about	 practical	coordination	and	enabling	the	attainment	of	various	collective	goods,	not	about	political	obligation	per	se,	then	it	makes	sense	to	answer	Simmons’	other	pressing	questions	on	their	own	terms.	Disaggregating	 the	 issues	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 evaluating	 the	 idea	 of	legitimacy	as	merely	entailing	a	right	to	non-interference.	One	concern	for	my	approach	is	whether	 a	 legitimate	 institution	 could	 demand	more	 than	 non-interference	 if	more	was	required	to	function;	if,	for	example,	a	state	needed	more	insiders	to	function,	could	joining	the	state	as	an	insider	be	required?46	My	answer	is	that,	yes,	an	individual	could	have	a	moral	duty	to	join	or	create	an	institution.	However,	that	duty	does	not	arise	from	the	 institution’s	 legitimacy	 but	 from	 an	 external	 requirement	 like	 justice.	 That	 is,	 one	may	have	a	duty	of	justice	to	join	or	create	institutions.	But	what	explains	why	you	are	bound	 to	 join	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 justice,	 not	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 institution.	We	 need	 to	
                         43	For	example,	respect	for	the	law	is	considered	by	Buchanan,	The	Heart	of	Human	Rights,	p.	184	to	be	the	appropriate	response	to	legitimacy.	Raz	also	considers	respect,	loyalty,	and	allegiance	with	respect	to	the	law	in	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	91-99	and	The	Authority	of	Law,	pp.	250-261.	44	A.	John	Simmons,	“Justification	and	Legitimacy,”	Ethics,	109	(1999),	739-771.	45	In	case	there	is	any	question,	my	understanding	of	legitimacy,	while	weaker	than	Simmons’,	is	also	not	the	same	as	Simmons’	 justification;	my	view	applies	to	particular	institutions	and	includes	deontological	elements.	46	Thanks	to	Tamara	Jugov	and	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	concern.	
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carefully	distinguish	the	various	moral	demands	that	are	made	of	us	and	their	sources.	I	claim	 that	 legitimacy	plays	 a	 narrow	 role	 in	 our	moral	 evaluations	 of	 institutions	 and	that	restraining	legitimacy	to	such	a	role	is	actually	a	strength	of	the	theory.	To	 close	 I	 highlight	 two	 further	 advantages	 of	 a	 more	 disaggregated	 and	minimalist	approach	to	state	 legitimacy.	One	of	 the	common	motivations	of	revisionist	theories	 of	 legitimacy	 is	 that	 that	 they	 may	 allow	 us	 to	 resist	 the	 conclusions	 of	philosophical	anarchists	like	Simmons.	Anarchists’	arguments	focus	on	how	implausible	and	difficult	 it	 is	 to	 establish	 a	 general	 obligation	 to	 obey.	On	my	 approach,	 however,	such	a	general	obligation	need	not	exist	for	a	state	to	be	legitimate.	All	that	needs	to	be	established	 is	 that	 the	 state	 is	 sufficiently	non-rights-violating	 for	 it	 to	have	a	 right	 to	function	without	coercive	interference.		This	 is	 especially	 important	 in	 light	 of	 the	many	 piecemeal	 and	 individualized	considerations	 that	 are	 insufficient	 on	 the	 traditional	 approach.	 For	 example,	 many	people	 have	 promised	 to	 obey	 the	 state,	 like	 public	 officials.	 This	 cannot	 ground	 a	general	obligation	to	obey,	but	it	does	explain	why	such	consenters’	rights	are	generally	not	 being	 violated	 by	 imposition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 Similarly,	many	 people	may	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 state’s	 Razian,	 instrumental	 authority.	 Such	 authority	 is	 too	piecemeal	 to	 ground	 a	 general	 obligation	 to	 obey.47	 But	 it	 could	 explain	 why	 many	people	are	not	wronged	by	the	imposition	of	some	laws,	thus	increasing	the	chance	that	the	 state	 is	 legitimate	 on	 my	 view	 because	 it	 is	 not	 violating	 rights	 as	 much	 as	 it	otherwise	would	be.48	Once	we	start	to	gather	all	these	considerations	together,	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	many	actual	states	are	legitimate	in	the	sense	I	am	concerned	with	(although	most	states	are	not	owed	general	obedience,	as	anarchists	correctly	claim).		Finally,	 minimalism	 about	 legitimacy	 results	 in	 more	 useful	 and	 plausible	evaluations	 of	 legitimacy.	 Political	 philosophers	 have	 a	 very	 pessimistic	 view	 of	 state	legitimacy.	According	to	a	rising	philosophical	consensus,	most	or	even	all	actual	states	are	 illegitimate,	with	 the	 possible	 exception	 of	 a	 few	 Scandinavian	 states.	 This	 tide	 of	philosophical	 anarchism	has	 pushed	 our	 field	 far	 from	other	 discourses	 of	 legitimacy,	limiting	our	ability	to	fruitfully	engage.	It	 is	 interesting	 to	 compare	 the	 philosophical	 convergence	 on	 legitimacy	 with	legitimacy	 as	 it	 is	 understood	 in	 international	 law,	 for	 example.	 Philosophers	 tend	 to	have	 very	 demanding	 standards	 for	 legitimacy	 combined	 with	 a	 very	 robust	 view	 of	what	 standing	 legitimacy	 confers	 and	 what	 demands	 can	 be	 made	 of	 citizens	 by	legitimate	states.	International	law,	on	the	other	hand,	has	the	pernicious	combination	of	very	 undemanding	 standards	 combined	 with	 robust	 standing	 and	 robust	 demands.	According	 to	 international	 law,	a	 state	 is	 legitimate	and	has	 sovereignty	 just	 in	 case	 it	has	 effective	physical	 control	 over	 a	 territory,	which	 in	 turn	 grants	 it	 a	wide	 range	of	rights.		Many	 international	 lawyers,	 scholars	 of	 international	 relations,	 and	 political	scientists	 tend	 to	 be	 very	 dismissive	 of	 philosophical	 approaches	 to	 legitimacy.49	Philosophers’	theories	are	criticized	as	unrealistic,	utopian,	and	naive.	One	response	to	this	 is	 simply	 to	 scoff	 back,	 to	 maintain	 that	 philosophers’	 theories	 articulate	 apt	normative	 standards	 regardless	 of	whether	 those	 standards	 are	met.	 This	 response	 is	foreseeably	unproductive.		
                         47	 See	Besson,	 “The	Authority	of	 International	 Law	–	Lifting	 the	 State	Veil,”	 for	 a	 valuable	discussion	of	how	the	coordinative	aspect	of	Razian	authority	could	undergird	international	law.	48	 On	 my	 view	 legitimacy	 is	 binary,	 not	 scalar.	 But	 there	 are	 many	 ways	 we	 could	 account	 for	 scalar	assessments	 of	 legitimacy,	 for	 example	 in	 terms	 of	 how	much	 leeway	 in	wrongdoing	 an	 institution	 has	before	it	loses	its	legitimacy.	49	See	Thomas,	“The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Legitimacy	in	International	Law.”	
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The	 approach	 to	 institutional	 legitimacy	 that	 I	 am	 pursuing	 here	 allows	 us	 to	engage	more	directly,	and	hopefully	more	fruitfully,	with	understandings	of	legitimacy	in	international	 law	 and	 elsewhere.	 My	 approach	 combines	 relatively	 undemanding	standards	of	 legitimacy	with	a	weak	standing	and	weak	demands.	 Instead	of	 imposing	severely	 demanding	 standards,	my	 approach	 asks	 us	 to	weaken	 our	 understanding	 of	what	legitimacy	confers	on	institutions	and	demands	of	individuals.	Taking	my	approach	would	 allow	 philosophical	 considerations	 of	 legitimacy	 to	 return	 to	 a	 more	 robust	conversation	with	evaluations	of	legitimacy	as	they	are	made	elsewhere.	In	conclusion,	I	reiterate	that	my	goals	for	this	paper	were	mainly	exploratory.	I	have	shown	that	there	is	promise	in	approaching	legitimacy	from	a	general	institutional	perspective,	 especially	 as	 we	 consider	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 non-state,	 international	institutions.	 There	 is	 a	 coherent	 and	 useful	 notion	 of	 legitimacy	 that	 applies	 to	institutions	 of	 any	 kind	 and	 asks	 whether	 they	 have	 the	 right	 to	 function	 without	coercive	interference.	This	approach	to	legitimacy	may	not	only	unify	various	projects,	it	may	also	 illuminate	 some	classic	questions	about	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	 state	and	what	sorts	 of	 demands	 states	 can	make	 of	 us.	 Part	 of	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	minimalism	 of	my	understanding	 of	 legitimacy,	 which	 opens	 further	 moral	 categories	 for	 independent,	clear	evaluation.				 	
